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Abstract. This paper examines the systematic risk in those banks that participated as 
issuers of securitization transactions in the Spanish market. Using event study methodol-
ogy and allowing systematic risk to change gradually within the event window, this paper 
provides empirical evidence that securitization has a positive impact on Spanish bank’s 
systematic risk (beta) from the beginning to the end of the event window. Additionally, 
we assess how much of the beta effect is due to volatility and how much to market cor-
relation. The increase in beta is solely due to an increase in banks’ correlations, improving 
portfolio diversification. The empirical results presented in this paper show important 
informative implications for the different agents related to banks. This creates a challenge 
for financial regulation, which has typically focused on individual institutions.
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Introduction
Securitization has been the object of harsh criticism because of its links to the origin 
of the financial crisis. Problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard, derived 
from the dissociation of securitized asset portfolios from issuing banks, might give rise 
to loans of lower credit quality. It is along these lines that several studies have served 
to augment the lack of confidence in this process. Among others, Keys et al. (2010) 
indicate that securitized assets are more likely to default than unsecuritized assets with 
similar characteristics due to a lack of banking control. Purnanandam (2009) highlights 
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that the banks that securitized using the “originate to distribute” model tend to create 
lower quality mortgages. Similarly, Calmes and Teóret (2010) indicate that off-balance-
sheet activities tend to increase the bank’s systemic risk. Specifically, Fahri and Tirole 
(2009) point to securitization as a mechanism that reinforces financial leverage and 
increases systemic risk. Further, some authors, such as Douglas and Raghuram (2009), 
hold that the misallocation of resources by the financial sector within the real estate 
sector were responsible for the crisis in the USA. These resources were, in the main, 
obtained through securitization. The most commonly mentioned problems of securitiza-
tion are its complexity, off-balance sheet treatment, asymmetric information problems, 
agency problems and relatively high transaction costs (Pinto 2014).
The seriousness and the sweeping nature of the present crisis indicate that risk-transfer 
activities have led to increased risks in at least some parts of the financial system. Banks 
have traditionally eliminated very few risks from their balance sheets. However, in re-
cent years, they have increased their risk-transfer activities and one of the mechanisms 
by which they do this is securitization.
This is the context within which the study has been framed. It attempts to empirically 
analyse the systematic risk generated by those entities that issue securitized assets and 
how this affected systemic risk in the Spanish market between 1993 and 2010. We be-
lieve that this work complements and enlarges upon other empirical studies in the field 
for various reasons.
First, the analysis focuses on the Spanish market. In spite of the fact that the Spanish 
securitization market is highly significant, research has tended to centre on the factors 
that promote securitization (Cardone-Riportella et al. 2010), on the effects of securiti-
zation on the issuing banks’ share prices (Martínez-Solano et al. 2009; López-Penabad 
et al. 2015) or on the issuing banks’ solvency (López-Andión et al. 2015). There are 
no empirical studies that analyse how securitization influences systematic and systemic 
risk within the Spanish market, as will be seen in the following section.
What makes this study especially innovative are; the peculiarities of the Spanish se-
curitization market i.e. that which sets it apart in terms of legislation, the fact that 
the Spanish model is well established and simple when it comes to the structure of 
securitization, the nature of the traditional Spanish banking model and the high rate of 
retentions in the equity tranche1.
Further, the time frame used in the study is extensive and takes in the period when 
securitization first began in Spain in 1993, and goes up to 2010 and thus captures the 
last three years of the crisis.
We believe that our study provides an original contribution to the literature that looks 
at the effects of securitization on systematic and systemic risk. The geographical focus 
1 Securitization is a mechanism that facilitates the stratification of credit risk. The bonds are issued in 
different series with a specific subordinate structure. In the lower part of this structure are the series 
containing the lowest credit quality products, the equity tranche, which is normally retained by the 
issuer in order to provide the required credit enhancement level to the higher tranches, “mezzanine” 
and “senior”.
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of the work is different and looks at distinct banking structures governed by a different 
kind of legislation. Further, the time-frame used is broad in scope and takes in the years 
of the crisis. Given that the predominant securitization model in the Spanish market has 
been “originate to hold”, it would seem likely that the exposition to global risk of the 
issuing entities in this study increases, unless the final portfolio losses exceed those of 
the first loss tranche (equity tranche). Further, the effect of securitization will be con-
ditioned by the reinvestment strategy adopted by the issuing entities. When there is a 
perceivable increase in the systematic risk in the issuing entities, it becomes of interest 
to analyse whether or not this increase is due to a greater correlation between banking 
entities or an increase in specific risk. Thus, it becomes possible to discover if there 
has been an increase in systemic risk, which the current crisis would seem to suggest.
The rest of this study is set out as follows; the following section contains a review of 
the existing literature. This is followed by a section which describes the data-base used 
and the methodology adopted. The following section gives and interprets the results of 
the econometric analysis carried out. The final section sets out the main conclusions.
1. Review of the existing literature
The securitization of assets is a financial operation by which a set of illiquid assets is 
transformed into a series of securities which are then placed in the marketplace (se-
curitization bonds) and guaranteed by a series of specific payment flows. At the same 
time therefore, depending on the process via which it is carried out, securitization is, to 
a greater or lesser extent, a mechanism for transferring risk. Hence, securitization has 
an important effect on the risk profile and the financial soundness of the issuing entities 
and on the financial system as a whole.
We first analyse the direct impact of securitization on the risk incurred by the issuing 
entity, that is, the amount of risk which is transferred to the market. Studies that high-
light the stabilizing effect of securitization indicate that the banks’ exposure to overall 
risk is likely to be reduced if the tail risk of the senior tranches transferred to external 
investors exceeds the default risk of first loss tranches which are typically retained by 
the bank. This produces a transfer of risk from the issuing entity to the investors (Jiangli 
et al. 2007). Other studies that highlight the fragility of the securitization mechanism, 
demonstrate that the major part of the default risk remains within the bank’s first loss 
tranche as a sign of quality for external investors (DeMarzo 2005; Instefjord 2005).
Secondly, this study analyses the indirect impact of securitization on the originator 
entity. The effect of securitization will depend on the strategy adopted by the origina-
tor when reinvesting the resulting liquidity. This impact depends on the investment 
policy adhered to and is defined by the risk transformation that the bank’s portfolio 
undergoes (Leland 2007). In this sense, the reinvestment process, for those in which 
the stabilizing nature of securitization is of foremost importance, might give rise to 
improved diversification on the entity’s balance sheet if there is subsequent investment 
in new assets which are not closely related to the rest of the assets in the portfolio. In 
contrast, for those that stress the debilitating nature of securitization, the effect on the 
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entity’s financial stability depends on the level of risk of the new assets which is in turn 
determined, to a large extent, by the level of market competitiveness (Instefjord 2005). 
Hence, if the liquidity obtained via securitization is used to increase the amount of total 
assets, or the repurchase of shares and the payment of higher dividends for example, 
this might generate even greater leverage, debilitating the financial stability of the entity 
(Shin 2009; Leland 2007).
Taking the market as a whole, credit risk transfer might increase bank risk in a systemic 
sense in spite of the fact that individual bank risk does not increase. Securitization al-
lows the banks to shed specific risk, risk which is associated with lending. However, a 
collateral effect might be that the banks become more closely correlated to one another. 
A situation of this type might increase the risk of systemic crises in the financial system 
(Elsinger et al. 2006; Acharya, Yorulmazer 2007; Wagner 2009) given that it increases 
the likelihood that banks incur losses jointly. In addition, securitization normally ex-
poses banks to greater funding risk. In the main, these risks are systemic in nature as 
recent events have shown, given that the markets of securitized assets and the markets 
that fund these assets are going through difficulties.
The empirical studies that analyse the effects of securitization on the risk profile are in 
agreement that there is an increase in the systematic risk for the issuing entities (Franke, 
Krahnen 2006; Hänsel, Krahnen 2007; Udhe, Michalak 2010; Nijskens, Wagner 2011; 
Le et al. 2015). These works suggest that the effect of the reduction in risk derived from 
securitization is absorbed by the reinvestment of the liquidity in projects with greater 
risk and that, essentially, this reduction is determined by the stratification technique 
used for the issue of securitization. Therefore, an increasing post-event beta must be the 
consequence of the fact that the first loss tranches are more likely to incur defaults than 
the senior tranches, which carry less risk and have been transferred to external investors. 
In addition, Nijskens and Wagner (2011) show that the increase in beta is due solely to 
an increase in banking correlations.
As stated above, the object of this work is to study the systematic risk of the issuing 
entities in Spain and how this might be transformed into systemic risk. In the Spanish 
market, we know that the predominant model of securitization has been “originate to 
hold”2, which only produces one real transfer of risk when the final loss of the portfolio 
exceeds the first loss tranche. Hence, we might expect an increase in the systematic risk 
of the issuing entities. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that there is an indirect 
effect derived from the reinvestment of the new funds that have been captured that 
might be allocated to assets with a lower correlation with the issuing entity’s portfolio, 
improving diversification, or, just the reverse, they might be destined to acquire assets 
of lower credit quality. In this sense, and particularly in the last few years when the 
supply of credit has expanded, securitization might have given rise to an increase in 
the volume of lower quality of credit. Not only would this have led to the generation of 
products of lower credit quality, but it would also have undermined the banks’ financial 
2 Among others, Catarineu and Pérez (2008) and Cardone et al. (2010).
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soundness, and increased their risk. This study also separates the systematic risk into 
two components; volatility and market correlation. This makes it possible to see how 
each of these evolves and to determine the potential transformation of systematic risk 
into systemic risk.
2. Data and econometric method
2.1. Data and sources
Our database is made up of 468 issues of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and asset 
backed securities (ABS) which were carried out in Spain between 1993 and July 2010. 
The data was obtained by referring to the National Stock Market Commission (CNMV – 
acronym in Spanish), the Association of Financial Asset Intermediaries for the Spanish 
market for corporate debt (AIAF-acronym in Spanish), and the existing Spanish asset 
securitization management companies’ web pages. In addition, there is data that cor-
responds to the daily share prices at the close of trading for 14 of the banks3 that have 
been the originators in the issue of securitization. This data was obtained from the web 
page for Spanish markets (BME-initials in Spanish). In our data base we have counted 
up to 25 banks that have acted as originators, but have only been able to obtain clos-
ing prices for those entities that have been quoted on the stock exchange for at least a 
minimum period of time4. Hence, our database is limited to 185 emissions of traditional 
securitization, with an average volume of 1090 Million €, corresponding to 14 quoted 
issuing banks (Table 1). Of these banks, the most active have been BBVA with 30 is-
sues, followed by Santander with 27 and Bankinter with 23. The largest securitization 
issues, in terms of volume, were also originated by these three banks, and together with 
the Banco Popular and Banesto, they were responsible for issuing 55% of all operations 
with mortgage collateral.
As indicators of the market portfolio the study uses data from the daily close-of-trading 
figures for the Ibex-35 and the IGBM for the period being studied.
2.2. Econometric methodology
The main goal of the study is to analyse the effects of securitization on the systematic 
risk of the issuing banks measured using the beta coefficient. In the classical CAPM 













where Ri and Rm represent the returns of the banks’ stocks and the market respectively; 
3 The banks for which stock market quotes are available are shown in Table 1.
4 Since the savings banks are not quoted on the stock exchange it is not possible to obtain an indica-
tor as to how their securitization activity is affecting systematic risk, even though it is an important 
proportion of all securitization in Spain. However, given the characteristics of these entities, and that 
little of their activity takes place outside Spain, there are good reasons to believe that the return of 
these entities is similar to that of the quoted banks.
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ρi, m the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the return of the asset and that of the 
market; and σi and σm the standard deviation of the stock’s return and that of the market 
respectively. Therefore, the changes in beta depend on changes in the standard deviation 
of the return of the banks’ stocks in relation to the market and the correlation between 
the stock and market return.
In line with Franke and Krahnen (2006), we assume that losses in the bank’s portfolio 
have a direct impact on the current market value of the bank’s stocks. As a consequence, 
a higher standard deviation of default losses incurred by the bank translates into a higher 
standard deviation of its stock returns. Hence, when the correlation between market re-
turn and the banks’ stock return remains constant, a higher standard deviation in stock 
return produces an increase in systematic bank risk. It is also assumed that an increase in 
the banks’ loan portfolio granularity implies a greater correlation between the bank and 
the market. Therefore, an increase in granularity will give rise to greater diversification 
in the portfolio which will become more closely aligned to that of the market, increas-
ing the correlation between market return and the stocks held in portfolio. In addition, 
it should be remembered that any variation in the systematic risk depends on the bank’s 
pre-event risk level compared to the market level. Hence, when the level of pre-event 
systematic risk is lower (greater) than the market level, an increase in the correlation 
with market return might lead to an increase (decrease) in the banks’ systematic risk.
Following Uhde and Michalak (2010), the model proposed for this analysis is based on 
the classical CAPM model and uses dummy variables to reflect the fact that an entity’s 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. Issuing volume by bank in the sample (millions of €)
T Total volume Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Total securitizations 185 201000 1090 1180 17.9 8500
Banks
Banco de Andalucía 8 2180 272 96.2 72.8 403
Banesto 10 13700 1370 676 545 2300
Bankinter 23 24200 1050 477 320 2040
BBVA 30 64000 2130 1860 28 8500
Banco de Castilla 7 980 140 66.7 34 221
Banco de Crédito Balear 7 401 57.3 25.8 26.5 103
Banco de Galicia 7 836 119 54.5 26.8 200
Banco Guipuzcoano 13 3050 235 140 60.1 597
Banco Pastor 13 7270 559 262 150 1000
Banco Popular 12 20700 1720 1500 243 6000
Banco de Sabadell 14 14400 1030 353 500 1740
Banco de Santander 27 44300 1640 966 262 3590
Banco de Valencia 7 4320 617 334 55 979
Banco de Vasconia 7 807 115 72.4 17.9 220
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systematic risk might change on or around the date when the event occurs or becomes 




, ,0 ,1 , 1, , 2, , ,,1 ,1R R D R D R ,∆ ∆= β + β + β + β + ηi t i i m t t m t t m t i ti i  (2)
where Ri,t and Rm,t are the daily returns on banks’ stocks i and the market portfolio m 
at a trading day t. These returns are obtained as the first difference of the logarithm of 
stocks prices. Ibex-35 is deemed to be the market portfolio index. The event windows or 
intervals used are [–30, +30], [–20, +20], [–10, +10] and [–5, +5] days, and the regres-
sions are carried out using 241 data symmetrically moving around the event day. t0 is 
the date of the event and is when the securitization is registered with the CNMV. D1,t 
and D2,t are the dummy variables. D1,t takes a value of 1 if T1 ≤ t ≤ T2, and T1 and T2 
represent the start and end of the window, and takes a value of 0 otherwise. D2,t takes 
a value of 1 if t > T2 and 0 for the rest.
The methodology, proposed by Cyree and DeGennaro (2002), allows the analysis to 
reflect that the change in the banks’ systematic risk does not necessarily follow a linear 
function. Therefore, in order to allow the systematic risk to vary gradually during the 
period of the event and to leave the window at higher or lower levels, betas were es-
tablished that vary as follows:
 ( )( ) ( )
event




,3 2 1 ,,1 T .T∆β = β − + ξi i ti  
(4)
Such that event,1∆βi measures the marginal change of systematic risk within the event 
window, allowing βi,1 to follow a continuous concave, convex or linear function. The 
parameter βi,2 indicates the functional form of the change in systematic risk during 
the event window. If βi,2 is negative (positive), the change in the systematic risk is a 
convex (concave) function during the window. If βi,2 is equal to zero, the change is a 
linear function.
Equation (4) describes after,1∆βi as the marginal change of the systematic risk within the 
post-event period. Hence, βi,1 might leave the window at a higher or a lower level com-
pared to the pre-event period depending on whether βi,3 is greater or lesser than zero. 
βi,1 might also be constant if βi,2 and βi,3 are zero.
By substituting (3) and (4) into (2) the following regression model is obtained:
( )( ) ( ) ( ), ,0 ,1 , ,2 1 2 1, , ,3 1 1, 2 1 2, , ,R R T t t T D R t T D T T D R . = β + β + β − − + β − + − + ε i t i i m t i t m t i t t m t i t
(5)
On allowing time varying betas during and after the event period introduces the error 
term ei,t as a function of market return, with a) , ,ε = ηi t i t  over the period of the pre-event 
estimation, b) , , , ,Rε = η + υi t i t i t m t  during the window and c) , , , ,Rε = η + ξi t i t i t m t within 
the post-event period. In this work it is assumed that the variance of the error term ei,t 
is not constant and that the variability is captured through a GARCH (1,1): 
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2
, ,0  ,1 , ,2 , 1h h ,−= α + α ε + αi t i i i t i i t  
(6)
where ( )2, , 1h E / −= ε Ωi t i t t  is the conditional variance of ei,t.
Table 2 shows that there are clusters of volatility. This result is obtained by analysing 
the significance of the first order autocorrelation coefficients of the squared and absolute 
values of bank’s returns using Ljung-Box statistics. Hence, it was possible to confirm 
the need to model the conditional variance together with the equation for the conditional 
mean to obtain the most efficient estimators. In addition, it can be observed that the se-
ries of returns are stationary (ADF test) and do not follow a normal distribution (JB test). 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of bank stock returns
Banks S K JB p-val ADF p-val Q(rt2) p-val Q(|rt|) p-val N. obs
Banco de 
Andalucía 
–0.4 24.3 65793.9 0.0 –63.4 0.0 176.5 0.0 278.7 0.0 3489
Banesto –0.9 27.2 72779.8 0.0 –56.4 0.0 129.2 0.0 319.0 0.0 2977
Bankinter 0.3 7.6 2525.5 0.0 –50.7 0.0 271.3 0.0 227.1 0.0 2752
BBVA 0.2 10.0 8157.9 0.0 –58.5 0.0 185.7 0.0 367.9 0.0 3972
Banco de 
Castilla




0.2 18.5 27042.3 0.0 –30.9 0.0 37.5 0.0 97.5 0.0 2702
Banco de 
Galicia
0.4 14.1 13895.8 0.0 –35.4 0.0 232.1 0.0 266.0 0.0 2700
Banco 
Guipuzcoano
0.8 12.2 10802.6 0.0 –58.6 0.0 122.0 0.0 240.5 0.0 2975




0.1 10.5 7522.4 0.0 –55.0 0.0 92.4 0.0 228.8 0.0 3213
Banco 
Sabadell
0.6 13.4 9045.1 0.0 –42.0 0.0 55.8 0.0 44.5 0.0 1981
Banco 
Santander
0.4 13.7 16607.7 0.0 –59.1 0.0 299.0 0.0 524.5 0.0 3462
Banco de 
Valencia
0.5 9.3 2976.4 0.0 –43.7 0.0 89.7 0.0 161.2 0.0 1733
Banco de 
Vasconia
0.2 16.6 20328.8 0.0 –58.3 0.0 298.5 0.0 279.5 0.0 2654
Notes: S is the Skewness and K is the Kurtosis; JB denotes the Jarque-Bera normality test; ADF is 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test which lags for the auxiliary equation are determined with 
the Schwarz criterion; Q(rt2) and Q(|rt|) are the Ljung-Box tests for the first order autocorrelation of 
the squares and the absolute values of the return respectively. The data used corresponds to the period 
between January 1994 and October 2010.
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Further, following equation (1), we analyse which parts of the banks’ beta correspond 
to their correlation with the market and which to the relative standard deviation. Sub-
sequently, we estimate whether the possible change in the systematic risk has led to a 
change in bank correlations.
The aim of this procedure is to normalize the stocks and market returns by using their 
respective standard deviations. By doing this and following Nijskens and Wagner 
(2011), we obtain a series with a standard deviation of one. From equation (1) we 
reach the stage at which the estimated regression coefficient of these transformed returns 
equals the correlation of the original series. This normalization can be implemented in 
the modified regression model, equation (5), where the symbol ~ represents the trans-
formed series:
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R .
R if  T
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≥
 < σ= 
 ≥σ
m i t
m i t T
m i t
m i t
m i t T
t
t
   (8)
In the computation of the normalized variables, we allowed standard deviations to differ 
before and after the beginning of the window (T1).
The results of the estimation of equation (7), together with the equation for the condi-
tional variance, allow us to see the beta correlation component and its possible variation 
as a consequence of securitization.
Finally, in order to evaluate how much of the variation in the beta is due to the correla-
tion effect (a change in ,ρi m) and how much to the bank’s standard deviation relative 




), we derive an expression for the change in the relative 
standard deviation. The periods immediately prior and subsequent to the event window 




1 1 0 0
, , ,1 1 . 
σ σ
β = ρ = ρ + ∆ρ = β + ∆β
σ σ
i i
i i m i m i m i i
m m
  (9)
Reordering we obtain the equation for the change in the relative standard deviation:
 
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
, , ,
.
σ σ σ β + ∆β β
∆ = − = −
σ σ σ ρ + ∆ρ ρ
i i i i i i
m m m i m i m i m
  (10)
3. Results
As indicated above, 185 estimations were carried out using a sample of 241 trading 
days symmetrically set around the securitization registry date with the CNMV. Using 
event study methodology, the analysis calculated the mean for each of the estimated 
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coefficients in equations (5) and (6). In order to test whether this mean is significantly 
different from zero we first use a conventional parametric test, the “t” test. Since the 
validity of this test depends on the assumption of normality, which is infringed in this 
case, the analysis is completed by using a non-parametric test. This test is known as the 
Wilcoxon test (signed rank test) for the median, which is more effective when there is 
no normality. The results are completed with the number and percentage of the coef-
ficients which are significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level.
The results are shown in Table 3 below. Given that the results for the different win-
dows do not differ substantially, we only comment in depth on the results for the +/–20 
window, since these were fairly representative, even though this table shows all of the 
values for all of the windows.
Table 3. Results for registry dates (Ibex-35)
Window+/–5   Wilcoxon  Coefs sig 10%
 Mean est. t-statistic p-val Signed rank p-val Number Percentage
β0 –0.046375 –5.690 0.000 5.280 0.000 49 26.49
β1 0.842085 17.727 0.000 11.346 0.000 146 78.92
β2 0.003985 1.985 0.049 0.725 0.468 28 15.14
β3 0.002455 1.251 0.212 1.696 0.090 75 40.54
α0 0.593823 5.739 0.000 11.722 0.000 138 74.59
α1 0.226666 14.292 0.000 11.246 0.000 168 90.81
α2 0.542979 19.159 0.000 10.708 0.000 147 79.46
β 0.842085       
Δβ 0.02455       
Window+/–10   Wilcoxon  Coefs sig 10%
 Mean est. t-statistic p-val Signed rank p-val Number Percentage
β0 –0.046564 –5.706 0.000 5.358 0.000 49 26.5
β1 0.839062 17.468 0.000 11.283 0.000 146 78.9
β2 2.55E-04 0.722 0.471 0.236 0.814 33 17.8
β3 0.001489 1.512 0.132 1.979 0.048 73 39.5
α0 0.564623 5.656 0.000 11.708 0.000 131 70.8
α1 0.228713 14.334 0.000 11.335 0.000 164 88.7
α2 0.562143 20.753 0.000 10.996 0.000 148 80.0
β 0.839062       
Δβ 0.02978       
Window+/–20   Wilcoxon  Coefs sig 10%
 Mean est. t-statistic p-val Signed rank p-val Number Percentage
β0 –0.045037 –5.500 0.000 5.087 0.000 52 28.1
β1 0.84357 17.589 0.000 11.338 0.000 147 79.5
β2 2.29E-05 0.308 0.759 0.758 0.448 57 30.8
β3 0.000644 1.224 0.223 1.729 0.084 76 41.1
α0 0.609594 5.715 0.000 11.714 0.000 133 71.9
α1 0.228367 14.259 0.000 11.357 0.000 166 89.7
α2 0.537521 18.986 0.000 10.692 0.000 143 77.3
β 0.84357       
Δβ 0.02576       
102
A. Iglesias-Casal et al. Market perception of bank risk and securitization in Spain
Window+–30   Wilcoxon  Coefs sig 10%
 Mean est. t-statistic p-val Signed rank p-val Number Percentage
β0 –0.045084 –5.570 0.000 5.160 0.000 47 25.4
β1 0.846527 17.545 0.000 11.305 0.000 145 78.4
β2 7.98E-06 0.277 0.782 0.606 0.545 60 32.4
β3 0.000415 1.124 0.263 1.643 0.101 79 42.7
α0 0.564773 5.542 0.000 11.698 0.000 131 70.8
α1 0.230451 14.545 0.000 11.393 0.000 167 90.3
α2 0.563521 20.821 0.000 10.985 0.000 145 78.4
β 0.846527       
Δβ 0.0249       
Notes: The estimated model is 
( )( ) ( ) ( ), ,0 ,1 , ,2 1 2 1, , ,3 1 1, 2 1 2, , ,R R T t t T D R t T D T T D R = β + β + β − − + β − + − + ε i t i i m t i t m t i t t m t i t
for the mean and 2, ,0  ,1 , ,2 , 1h h −= α + α ε + αi t i i i t i i t  for the conditional variance. The estimations were 
carried out for 185 securitizations using a sample of 241 trading days symmetrically set around the se-
curitization registry date in accordance with event analysis methodology for windows of 10, 20, 40 and 
60 days. The results included are the mean for each of the estimated coefficients in the previous equa-
tions for 185 regressions, the conventional parametric “t” test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed 
rank test in order to test the significance of the mean. The results are completed with the number and 
percentage of the coefficients which are significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level.
The parameters that measure the possible change in the systematic risk are significantly 
different from zero in 57 cases for β2 and in 76 cases for β3. The changes in the system-
atic risk measured within these parameters are not large enough to obtain a mean which 
is significantly different from zero in the case of β2, but they are with respect to β3.
With respect to the GARCH(1,1) equation, 90% of α1 values and 77.3% of α2 are sig-
nificant, which confirms the need to model the conditional variance.
The mean of estimated coefficients β1 before the event window is 0.843. The mean of 
coefficients β2 is positive (2.29×10–5) but not significant, which means that the evolu-
tion of the systematic risk during the event window follows a linear trend. At the end of 
the window, the systematic risk reaches a maximum of 0.869 (Fig. 1). This evolution is 
the consequence of having obtained a significant mean value for β3 of 0.0006. Hence, 
the mean change in the systematic risk within the window is 0.0257.
To a certain extent, the choice of the window is arbitrary. We assumed that the response 
of stock prices to securitization announcements5, during and after the event period, com-
pletely reflects the economic impact of securitizations on the issuing bank’s systematic 
risk. Since we do not know the period that takes in the complete market reaction to these 
events, we carry out estimations for periods of 10, 20, 40 and 60 days. The results are 
similar for all of the windows. Therefore, even if the daily change in the systematic risk 
during the window differs in function of its size, the post-event beta resulting from the 
accumulated change is highly similar in all four cases: 0.866, 0.868, 0.869 and 0.871 
for the windows of 11, 21, 41 and 61 days respectively.
5 The date when securitization is deemed to have been announced in the market is that which is reg-
istered with the CNMV.
End of Table 3
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The results of this analysis confirm a linear increase in the systematic risk of the Span-
ish banks during the event window. Initially, given that securitization is a mechanism 
that facilitates risk transfer, this result might seem strange. However, risk transmission 
can be practically non-existent when the tail risk of the senior tranches falls below the 
degree of default risks included in the first-loss tranches retained by the originator. In 
addition, taking into account the indirect effect of the securitization, the post-event sys-
tematic risk increases when the bank reinvests in riskier assets. This scenario is fairly 
likely in the Spanish market since banks were permissive in awarding credit and the 
requisites and regulations became more relaxed prior to the crisis. The beta coefficient 
might also increase even when the reinvestment of the liquidity obtained via securitiza-
tion went towards a more highly diversified portfolio, if the pre-event systematic risk 
was lower than 1 as was the case of the sample used in this analysis (β1 = 0.843). The 
more highly diversified the bank’s portfolio, the closer its returns will be to those of the 
market portfolio and its beta to 1. In addition, the systematic risk might rise because the 
liquidity obtained from securitization is used to redistribute the capital structure. This 
could be in the form of paying greater dividends, or the repurchase of the company’s 
own shares, which normally leads to an increase in bank leverage, augmenting risk.
Once the levels of return have been normalized, equation (7) is estimated and the results 
are given in Table 4. If we focus on the results for the +/–20 window it may be observed 
that there is a significant increase in the correlations, given that the pre-event correla-
tion is 0.534 and increases to 0.021 at the end of the event window. Hence, it may be 
concluded that an increase in beta, on average, is due to an increase in the correlations.
Finally, equation (10) allows us to quantify the part of the increase in beta which is due 
to the standard deviation of the banks in relation to the market. The results obtained for 






 –0.0135) indicate that the whole of the increase 
in beta is due to an increase in the correlations between the banks and the market. This 
means that the increase in beta that occurs as the result of securitization gives rise to an 
Fig. 1. Systematic risk (+/–20 window)  
Note: Figure 1 refers to the results in Table 3 for the +/–20 window. The window shows  
the evolution of systematic risk within the event window for the set of 185 securitizations  
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Table 4. Results for registry dates (Ibex-35). Normalized
Window+/–5   Wilcoxon  Coefs sig 10%
 Mean est. t-statistic p-val Signed rank p-val Number Percentage
ρ0 –0.023581 –5.322 0.000 5.316 0.000 41 22.16
ρ1 0.534803 20.877 0.000 11.454 0.000 145 78.38
ρ2 0.002393 1.782 0.076 0.599 0.549 29 15.68
ρ3 0.001726 1.738 0.084 1.471 0.141 61 32.97
α0 0.156312 11.138 0.000 11.781 0.000 129 69.73
α1 0.215355 14.364 0.000 11.269 0.000 157 84.86
α2 0.552453 22.923 0.000 11.393 0.000 141 76.22
ρ 0.534803       
Δρ 0.01726       
Window+/–10   Wilcoxon  Coefs sig 10%
 Mean est. t-statistic p-val Signed rank p-val Number Percentage
ρ0 –0.023906 –5.326 0.000 5.313 0.000 49 26.5
ρ1 0.53437 20.945 0.000 11.437 0.000 149 80.5
ρ2 2.03E-04 0.840 0.402 0.078 0.938 36 19.5
ρ3 0.000953 1.916 0.057 2.003 0.045 58 31.4
α0 0.155979 10.595 0.000 11.782 0.000 131 70.8
α1 0.210654 14.427 0.000 11.182 0.000 155 83.8
α2 0.548763 21.778 0.000 11.186 0.000 140 75.7
ρ 0.53437       
Δρ 0.01906       
Window+/–20   Wilcoxon  Coefs sig 10%
 Mean est. t-statistic p-val Signed rank p-val Number Percentage
ρ0 –0.023129 –5.164 0.000 5.064 0.000 47 25.4
ρ1 0.534802 21.136 0.000 11.464 0.000 149 80.5
ρ2 4.11E-05 0.808 0.420 0.097 0.922 57 30.8
ρ3 0.000527 1.976 0.050 1.965 0.049 69 37.3
α0 0.152371 11.338 0.000 11.781 0.000 130 70.3
α1 0.219172 14.140 0.000 11.209 0.000 155 83.8
α2 0.539593 20.756 0.000 11.027 0.000 146 78.9
ρ 0.534802       
Δρ 0.02108       
Window+/–30   Wilcoxon  Coefs sig 10%
 Mean est. t-statistic p-val Signed rank p-val Number Percentage
ρ0 –0.024672 –5.624 0.000 5.317 0.000 49 26.5
ρ1 0.538938 21.153 0.000 11.511 0.000 147 79.5
ρ2 4.98E-06 0.282 0.778 0.278 0.781 52 28.1
ρ3 0.000298 1.596 0.112 1.414 0.158 71 38.4
α0 0.146717 11.754 0.000 11.789 0.000 133 71.89
α1 0.227509 14.773 0.000 11.379 0.000 159 85.95
α2 0.542522 22.191 0.000 11.282 0.000 141 76.22
ρ 0.538938       
Δρ 0.01788       
Notes: The estimated model is
( )( ) ( ) ( )   , ,0 ,1 , , ,2 1 2 1, , , ,3 1 1, 2 1 2, , , ,R R T t t T D R [ t T D T T D ]R= ρ + ρ + ρ − − + ρ − + − + εi t i i m i t i t m i t i t t m i t i t     
for the mean and 2, ,0  ,1 , ,2 , 1h h −= α + α ε + αi t i i i t i i t  for the conditional variance. The procedure is the 
same as described in Table 3.
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increase in bank correlations. At the same time, there is a slight reduction in the specific 
risk for each entity, as a result of a small improvement in their portfolio diversification. 
In light of these findings, it may be affirmed that securitization leads to an increase in 
the overall or systemic risk within the Spanish financial system.
All these results hold when using the IGBM rather than the Ibex-35 as the market 
portfolio indicator.
Conclusions
Using a sample of 185 traditional securitizations issued by 14 banks operating in the 
Spanish market between 1993 and 2010, this analysis finds that securitization has a 
positive impact on the issuing entities’ systematic risk and on the systemic risk within 
the whole of the Spanish financial system. The econometric study used event analysis 
that allowed systematic risk to change gradually within the event window.
The results show that securitization has a positive impact on the systematic risk of 
Spanish banks when the reference point used is this date when the securitization was 
registered with the CNMV. The banks’ systematic risk increases from the start of the 
event window and follows a linear function until reaching its highest post-event risk 
level. This result is highly relevant since there is a widely-held belief that the originator 
banks aim to use securitization to reduce their exposition to risk.
The increase in the systematic risk is consistent with the predominant securitization 
model used in Spain, “originate to hold”. There is, therefore, no real transfer of risk 
since the final loss of the portfolio is lower than the first loss tranche. From the point 
of view of the indirect effect, the increase in the systematic risk might be caused by the 
reinvestment of the liquidity obtained from securitization in products of lower credit 
quality, stimulated in recent years by the expansion in the availability of credit. How-
ever, the decomposition of the beta coefficient shows that the increase in the systematic 
risk is explained by an increase in the correlation between the originators’ returns and 
the market in spite of the fact that the relative standard deviation for each entity de-
clines on average. Hence, this breakdown allows us to affirm that securitization, from 
the point of view of the indirect effect, improves the diversification of the portfolio of 
issuing entities. 
Our results are consistent with those from other studies that highlight that the credit 
risk transfer has important effects on bank risk. In general terms it may be affirmed 
that the results of this study, with respect to the business of securitization in Spain, are 
consistent with those obtained in previously published analyses by authors such as Udhe 
and Michalak (2010), Lockwood et al. (1996), Franke and Krahnen (2006), Hänsel and 
Krahnen (2007), and Nijskens and Wagner (2011).
This work has analysed one measure of risk, systematic risk, which is highly relevant 
for today’s intensely competitive stock markets, given that, in accordance with the idea 
of stock price equilibrium, it is this risk which is the main determinant of price. Further, 
it has been proved that this increase in systematic risk creates greater risk within the 
financial system as a whole, that is, greater systemic risk.
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Finally, it should be highlighted that this work has certain informational consequences 
with respect to relevant collectives. For external or future investors, changes in system-
atic risk are fundamental indicators orienting portfolio readjustment; for the portfolio 
managers of the originators who are continually making adjustments to their financial 
structure; and, logically, for the regulators for whom this information might help to fo-
cus their control mechanisms, not simply on individual entities, but also on the market 
as a whole.
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